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Federal Jurisdiction: State Parens Patriae Standing
in Suits Against Federal Agencies
Following a June 1972 hurricane that ravaged the mid-Atlan-
tic coastal region, the Small Business Administration (SBA) dis-
tributed federal disaster relief directly to qualifying businesses.'
Alleging that the SBA's designation of Pennsylvania as a Class B
disaster area reduced the amount of aid available to Pennsylvania
businesses, 2 the state, claiming standing to sue as parens patriae
representative of all its aggrieved citizens, 3 sought review of the
SBA's implementation of the federal relief legislation. The Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the suit, and
the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that long-standing prin-
ciples of federalism precluded the state's parens patriae suit
against an agency of the federal government. Pennsylvania v.
Kleppe, 533 F.2d 668 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub nom. Penn-
sylvania v. Kobelinski, 97 S. Ct. 485 (1977).
Parens patriae originally described the power of the English
and American sovereigns to safeguard the interests of the in-
competent or indigent.4 Since the turn of the century, however,
1. Relief was extended to Pennsylvania upon its designation as a
major disaster area pursuant to the Disaster Relief Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C.
§ 4402 (1) (1970) (repealed by Pub. L. No. 93-288, § 603, 88 Stat. 164
(1974)) and was to be administered by the Small Business Administra-
tion under the provisions of 15 U.S.C. § 636 (b) (1970), and 42 U.S.C.§ 4451 (1970) (transferred to 15 U.S.C. § 636 (a) (Supp. V 1975)).
2. The "Class B" designation meant that the Pennsylvania relief
program would be administered from a regional rather than a national
headquarters. The state alleged that the classification indicated a lower
priority in the allocation of SBA resources, resulting in less total assist-
ance than would have been available under a "Class A" designation.
Pennsylvania v. Kleppe, 533 F.2d 668, 670 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
3. The state also claimed standing to sue on the basis of its pro-
prietary interest in the small businesses. The court, however, concluded
that the proprietary count was not a valid basis of standing because:
(a) the alleged general harm to the state's economy and welfare clearly
implicated the state's parens patriae rather than proprietary interests;
(b) the disaster relief legislation called for direct loans from the federal
government without state participation, and thus, any "impairment" of
the state's ability to perform its duties appeared to result from the action
or the inaction of the state itself; and (c) the allegation of reduced tax
revenues was insufficient in general to support state standing unless, as
with taxpayer standing, there was a specific nexus between the state's
role as a collector of revenues and the legislative or administrative
action being challenged. Id. at 671-73.
4. See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972);
Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 56-58 (1890); Strausberg,
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the Supreme Court has accepted a broader concept of parens
patriae that allows states to sue private parties or sister states
to protect their "quasi-sovereign" interests.5 Such interests must
be common to the general public, not limited to the special inter-
ests of a few.6 The state must also demonstrate that the col-
lective injuries to its citizens produced an independent injury to
the state's sovereign interests.7 This grant of parens patriae
standing was first recognized in cases where the state sued
to protect its natural resources from pollution or depletion.
Environmental parens patriae suits have arisen in disputes over
The Standing of a State as Parens Patriae to Sue the Federal Govern-
ment, 35 FED. B.J. 1, 2-3 (1976).
5. For a detailed discussion of this development, see Strausberg,
supra note 4 at 2-10; Comment, Standing of States to Represent the
Interests of Their Citizens in Federal Court, 21 Am. U.L. REV. 224, 232-
38 (1971).
6. See Oklahoma ex rel. Johnson v. Cook, 304 U.S. 387 (1938)
(shareholders' liability statute by which the state bank commissioner
could prosecute actions against nonresident shareholders was primarily
for the benefit of the creditors; state could not as parens patriae seek
to enforce the statute under the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction);
Oklahoma v. At;hison, T & S.F. Ry., 220 U.S. 277 (1911) (state denied
parens patriae standing to seek injunction against unreasonable freight
rates because the action was brought for the benefit of a limited class
of individual shippers). See also Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1 (1900).
Where the defendant in a parens patriae suit is a state, the prohibition
on special interest representation is required by the eleventh amend-
ment, which bars suits against a state by citizens of another state.
In New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76 (1883), for example, a New
Hampshire statute authorized citizens to assign their claims against
another state to the New Hampshire attorney general for prosecution in
their behalf. The Supreme Court dismissed the suit from its original
jurisdiction, holding that since New Hampshire clearly was suing for the
benefit of private individuals, the Court would not permit such a dilution
of the eleventh amendment.
The same principle was most recently affirmed in Pennsylvania v.
New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660 (1976), in which Pennsylvania sought parens
patriae standing to challenge a New Jersey tax on income earned in
New Jersey by nonresidents. The Court denied leave to file a bill of
complaint under its original jurisdiction, stating:
It has . . . become settled doctrine that a State has standing to
sue only when its sovereign or quasi-sovereign interests are
implicated and it is not merely litigating as a volunteer the per-
sonal claims of its citizens.
Pennsylvania's parens patriae suit against New Jersey repre-
sents nothing more than a collectivity of private suits against
New Jersey for taxes withheld from private parties. No sover-
eign or quasi-sovereign interests of Pennsylvania are implicated.
Id. at 665-66.
7. The Supreme Court has described the requisite state interest as
one "independent of and behind the titles of its citizens," Georgia v.
Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907), and "affectfing] the
general welfare of the State... [thus rising] above a mere question
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interstate water 8 and air 9 pollution and interstate water rights.10
Environmental concerns are particularly appropriate for classifi-
cation as quasi-sovereign'1 because individual citizens will often
lack standing to seek relief from damages to natural resources. 12
of local private right." Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 99 (1907). In-
herent in these definitions is the proposition that a state's interest is im-
plicated not by the mere collection of a number of individual injuries
for which each individual could bring suit, but rather the tendency for
such injuries in combination to have reciprocal "multiplier effects." See
Note, The Original Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court, 11
STAN. L. REv. 665, 672, 677 (1959). For a discussion of such an inde-
pendent interest, see Note, State Protection of its Economy and Environ-
ment: Parens Patriae Suits for Damages, 6 COLUm. J.L. & SOC. PROB.
411, 414-17 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Note, State Protection].
8. The original parens patriae case, Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S.
208 (1901), was a suit within the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction
in which Missouri sought to enjoin the Chicago Sanitary District from
discharging sewage into the Illinois River and fouling the water supply
of Missouri residents. See also New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 473
(1931) (New Jersey entitled to an injunction ordering the city of New
York to cease dumping garbage off the New Jersey coast; no discussion
of standing).
9. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 46 (1907) (allegations
of injury to forests, crops, and orchards sufficient to confer standing on
Georgia in suit to abate the emission of sulphuric acid gas from the de-
fendant's plant in Tennessee).
10. See Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660 (1931) (Connect-
icut entitled as parens patriae to litigate the merits of the contention that
in diverting the waters of the Connecticut River, Massachusetts invaded
the rights of Connecticut's citizens); North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S.
365 (1923) (North Dakota granted standing to seek an injunction against
a Minnesota river channelization project that created flood conditions);
Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907) (Kansas had standing to enjoin
the diversion of water from the Arkansas River).
11. Actions concerning air and water pollution would now arise
under the federal Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-18571 (1970 & Supp.
V 1975) or the Federal Water Pollution Control Amendments of 1972,
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. V 1975).
For injuries to other quasi-sovereign interests, for example, a fish
kill caused by an oil spill, the state must continue to rely on the common
law parens patriae suit. See Maine v. M/V Tamano, 357 F. Supp. 1097
(D. Me. 1973) (state allowed to sue vessel and its owners for damage
to water and marine life caused by large oil spill); Tarlock, Oil Pollution
on Lake Superior: The Uses of State Regulation, 61 MInN. L. REV. 63,
98-101 (1976).
12. Where the alleged polluter is a state, for example, the eleventh
amendment, which precludes federal jurisdiction over "any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State," U.S. CoNsT. amend. XI, bars a suit by
individual citizens. More important, vagaries of nuisance law and the
necessity of showing special damages may also prevent individual suits.
See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312,
257 N.E.2d 870 (1970). See also W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
or TORTS § 88, at 586-91 (4th ed. 1971).
19771
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
The Court has also accepted states' interests "in the continuing
prosperity of their economies"'u as grounds for parens patriae
standing. State suits under federal antitrust laws have been
the major source of litigation concerning such economic inter-
ests;"4 the states have claimed standing on the ground that the
13. The leading case for this proposition is Pennsylvania v. West
Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923), in which Pennsylvania and Ohio were
granted standing as parens patriae to challenge a West Virginia statute
that could have seriously curtailed the supply of natural gas carried by
pipeline from West Virginia. The plaintiff states alleged that the ex-
haustion of the energy supply would seriously jeopardize the "health,
comfort and welfare" of their residents.
14. In antitrust litigation, the state as parens patriae seeks recog-
nition as a "person" within the meaning of the federal antitrust laws
in order to enjoin the violators. The state in Georgia v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1944), based its complaint on a restraint of trade,
alleging that the railroads had fixed arbitrary and noncompetitive rates
that preferred the ports of other states. The Supreme Court held that
the state had standing to sue both as a proprietor and as parens patriae
representative of its citizens affected by the rates. Id. at 447-48. Justice
Douglas, writing for the majority, offered a broad justification on which
to base future state assertions of quasi-sovereign interests.
Discriminatory rates may cause a blight no less severe than the
spread of noxious gas. Georgia, as representative of the public,
is complaining of a wrong, which if proven, limits the oppor-
tunities of her people, shackles her industries, retards her de-
velopment and relegates her to an inferior economic position.
Id. at 450.
In Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. 405 U.S. 251 (1972), the Court held
that section 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970), was a statutory
grant of standing enabling the state as parens patriae to seek an in-junction against the gasoline overcharges allegedly harming the state's
economy. The Court also held, however, that the state lacked standing
under section 4 of the Act to recover treble damages. Id. at 260-66. The
antitrust laws have since been amended to allow states to recover mone-
tary damages as parens patriae. Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-435, § 301, 90 Stat. 1394 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §
15c).
Similarly, Burch v. Goodyear Tire Co., 420 F. Supp. 82 (D. Md. 1976),
involved a suit by Maryland alleging that the defendant tire and oil com-
panies had conspired to restrain competition among tire manufacturers
in the sale of tires to the oil companies' dealers. In granting standing
to the plaintiffs, the district court relied upon Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co.
and another recent antitrust action, Washington v. General Motors, 406
U.S. 109 (1972). The court, however, felt it appropriate to mention cer-
tain "countervailing considerations" to a grant of standing, including:
(1) if Congress had intended the states to prosecute the antitrust liti-
gation, it would have explicity stated so; (2) injury to the state's
economy is arguably of less magnitude than injury to the state's environ-
ment; and (3) standing policies favor concrete litigation between direct
adversaries, and to grant standing to an attorney general is to permit
suits by lawyers without clients. See generally Note, Federal Juris-
diction-Suits by a State as Parens Patriae, 48 N.C.L. Rnv. 963 (1970);
Note, Standing to Sue for Treble Damages Under Section 4 of the Clayton
Act, 64 CoLum. L. REv. 570 (1964); 82 HAav. L. REv. 1374 (1969).
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defendants' illegal practices caused harm to the state economy
greater than the sum of the widespread harms to individual
citizens.1 5
Despite the acceptance of parens patriae suits in these con-
texts, a long-standing rule prevents recognition of parens patriae
standing where the state sues the federal government or its
agencies. The proscription is based on the principle that such
suits are inconsistent with the concept of federalism and the di-
vision of power between national and state governments. The
rule originated in Massachusetts v. Mellon,16 in which the state
sued on its own behalf'1 and alternatively as parens patriae in
order to challenge on tenth amendment grounds the consti-
tutionality of the federal Maternity Act. Without discussing
whether the state's economic parens patriae claims met the test
for valid quasi-sovereign interests that had been developed in the
natural resources cases, the Supreme Court denied standing:
[I]t is no part of [the state's] duty or power to enforce [state
citizens'] rights in respect of their relations with the Federal
Government. In that field it is the United States, and not the
State which represents them as parens patriae, when such rep-
resentation becomes appropriate; and to the former, and not to
the latter, they must look for such protective measures as flow
from that status.' 8
Forty years after Mellon, Professor Bickel argued in a similar
vein that the rule against parens patriae standing to challenge
the constitutionality of federal statutes is necessary to preserve
"the most innovative principle of the Constitution: the principle
that the federal government is a sovereign coexisting in the same
territory with the states and acting, not through them, like some
international organization, but directly upon the citizenry."1 9
15. See Note, State Protection, supra note 7, at 414-17 (1970).
16. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
17. Massachusetts claimed that by imposing an "illegal option
either to yield to the Federal plan or lose a share of the money it is
otherwise entitled to," id. at 479-80, the federal statute usurped powers
reserved to the states by the tenth amendment. The Court held, how-
ever, that state sovereignty was not infringed because the state had only
to reject the proffered money in order to be free of the regulations. Id.
at 480.
18. Id. at 485-86.
19. Bickel, The Voting Rights Cases, 1966 Sup. CT. RLv. 79, 89.
Underlying all the parens patriae decisions is a concept of federalism
based on dual sovereignty. The framers of the Constitution intended
to avoid both the anarchy of a weak national government, which the
Articles of Confederation had produced, and the tyranny of one all-
1977]
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Whether the same principles apply in instances of non-consti-
tutional challenges is not answered in Mellon.20  Nevertheless,
powerful national sovereign. As described by James Madison,
[tihe idea of a national government involves in it, not only an
authority over the individual citizens; but an indefinite supre-
macy over all persons and things .... In this relation the pro-
posed Government cannot be deemed a national one; since itsjurisdiction extends to certain enumerated objects only, and
leaves to the several states a residuary and inviolable sover-
eignty over all other objects .... [Tihe proposed Constitution
therefore, is in strictness, neither a national nor a federal Consti-
tution, but a composition of both.
THE FEDERALIST No. 39 at 256-57 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). See also Mason,
The Role of the Court, in FEDERALISM: INFINITE VARIETES IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 8, 12-13 (V. Earle ed. 1968).
Resolving questions arising from the tension between congressional
authority under the supremacy and necessary and proper clauses and re-
served state powers under the tenth amendment has, since McCulloch
v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.), 316 (1819). been the particular nrovince
of the Supreme Court. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan,
325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945). At the turn of the century, the Court delineated
state and federal powers by relying on the concent of "dual sovereignty,"
portraying each sovereign as tenaciously harboring its appointed share of
power.
Under this view, the "task of policy-makers was ... to divine the
proper .. . equilibrium point between the two jurisdictions and avoid
encroachments by one level on the other." H. I.nER. FEDERALISM AND
CLEAN WATERS 1 (1975). See Elazar, Federalism and Intergovernmental
Relations. in COOPERATION AND CONFLICT; READINGS IN AMERICAN FED-
ERALISm 2 (D. Elazar ed. 1969) rhereinafter cited as COOPERATION AND
CONFLICT1; Elazar, Federal-State Cooperation in the Nineteenth Century
United States, in COOPERATION AND CONFLICT, mnra, at 83; Corwin, The
Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1 (1950).
In this century, the Court's model is one of coonerative federalism
which views the national and state governments as "mutually compli-
mentary parts of a single governmental mechanism." Corwin, suvra, at
19. Cooperation has been institutionalized through a variety of sharing
devices, including contracts to inter-change personnel and services, flat
or conditional grants-in-aid, tax offsets, and revenue sharing. See
Elazar, supra, at 11-18. See also Grodzins, The Future of the American
System, in CooPERArmoN AND CONFLICT, supra, at 61. Under this theory,
the federal zone of influence has been extended through the commerce
clause to reach interests which earlier would have been considered the
concern of the states. The basic idea of two sovereigns with separate
spheres of power, however, remains intact. This was recently affirmed
in National League of Cities v. Usery, 428 U.S. 833 (1976), in which
the Court held that application of minimum wage laws to state govern-
ment employees infringed the sovereignty of states. "[A] State is not
merely a factor in the 'shifting economic arrangements' of the private
sector of the economy, . . . but is itself a coordinate element in the
system established by the framers for governing our federal union." Id.
at 849 (citation omitted).
20. In New York v. United States, 331 U.S. 284 (1947), aff'g 65 F.
Supp. 856 (N.D.N.Y. 1946), the Court, with no discussion of standing,
heard and decided an appeal based on a challenge by states to an order of
the Interstate Commerce Commission. Strausberg, supra note 4, at 19-20,
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where that case has been raised as a bar to parens patriae
standing in suits against federal agencies, 21 the lower federal
courts have generally adhered to a blackletter rule that the
Mellon prohibition operates in every case involving a federal de-
fendant.22  Recently, however, in Washington Utilities and
Transportation Commission v. FCC3 (WUTC), the Ninth Circuit
held that the Mellon rule did not apply where a state agency
challenged a federal administrative agency's decision on non-
constitutional grounds. In such a case, the court reasoned,
the state agency "does not attack the constitutionality of the
[federal statute] on any ground; rather, it relies upon the
federal statute, and seeks to vindicate the congressional will by
preventing what it asserts to be a violation of that statute by
the administrative agency charged with its enforcement. '2 4
Although Kleppe was also an action against a federal ad-
ministrative agency, the court declined to adopt the distinction
suggested in WUTC. On the contrary, based on a concept of
"substantial federalism interests," it viewed the suit against the
agency as involving the same principles the Mellon Court saw
in a constitutional suit.
suggests that the issue was not raised before the Supreme Court because,
although the lower court had indicated approval of state parens patriae
standing to sue the agency, other adequate standing grounds were
present.
21. There are a few cases in which states apparently have sued as
parens patriae without a Mellon challenge to their standing. See Florida
v. Weinberger, 492 F.2d 488, 494 (5th Cir. 1974) (state may also have had
proprietary interest in "being spared the reconstitution of its statutory
program"); Puerto Rico v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 288 F.2d 419 (D.
C. Cir. 1961) (no discussion of standing); California v. United States,
180 F.2d 596 (9th Cir. 1950) (state also had proprietary standing).
22. See Public Util. Comm. v. United States, 356 F.2d 236 (9th Cir.
1966) (state denied parens patriae standing to challenge order of the
Federal Communications Commission); Minnesota v. Benson, 274 F.2d
764 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (Mellon held to preclude state standing to challenge
a milk marketing order of the Secretary of Agriculture that allegedly
disadvantaged Minnesota milk producers); Idaho v. First Security Bank,
315 F. Supp. 247, 278 (D. Idaho 1970) (state denied parens patriae
standing to challenge ruling by the Comptroller of the Currency). But
see Guam v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 329 F.2d 251 (D.C. Cir. 1964),
in which the government of Guam was granted standing to challenge
Federal Maritime Commission approval of a rate increase for ocean trans-
portation between the United States and Guam. The court of appeals
explicitly distinguished Mellon and Benson on the ground that in those
cases the state disputed an act of the federal government itself, whereas
"in utility cases involving private operators a state or municipal gov-
ernment may be a proper party and, if adversely affected as such by
an order, is aggrieved." Id. at 253.
23. 513 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 423 U.S. 836 (1975).
24. Id. at 1153.
19771
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The individual's dual citizenship in both state and nation, with
separate rights and obligations arising from each suggests that
both units of government act as parens patriae within their
separate spheres of activity .... 25
[T]he suit is a direct attempt by a state to insert itself be-
tween the national government and the legitimate objects of its
administrative authority. 26
The court's reasoning in support of its ruling may be set out
in a series of propositions drawn from the opinion: (1) any state
suit against the federal government raises questions of consti-
tutional allocations of power;27 (2) principles of federalism there-
fore demand separation of the state and federal parens patriae
powers;28 (3) disruption of agency processes inherent in a suit
by the state undermines those federalism interests; 29 (4) the
degree of disruption-and therefore the injury to principles of
federalism-is no less when the suit is brought on non-consti-
tutional grounds.8 0
Among lower federal courts that have applied Mellon to bar
suits against federal agencies, Kleppe is unusual in its attempt
to provide any reasoned justification of the position. Re-exami-
nation of Mellon and subsequent cases in which the Supreme
Court dealt with claims of parens patriae standing, however, indi-
cate that, contrary to the theory of Kleppe, the issues which
prompted the Court's ban against such suits do not arise in a
suit against a federal agency.
The argument against state standing to sue the federal
government is most compelling when a state sues on its
own behalf and seeks to overturn a federal statute on the ground
that supervision of the subject matter of the law is reserved to
25. Pennsylvania v. Kleppe, 533 F.2d 668, 676-77 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
26. Id. at 679.
27. Id. at 680.
28. The court referred to the "federalism interest in keeping sepa-
rate the state and national parens patriae functions, which the Supreme
Court has often recognized and never denied...." Id.
29. Id. at 678.
30. While, as a general proposition, it may be that non-consti-
tutional challenges tend to be less disruptive than constitutional
ones, which sometimes attack the legitimacy of an entire statute,
there is no reason to suppose that this will always be true.
Many constitutional challenges attack a statute not on its face,
but as applied to a single set of facts, and .in that respect are
much like many non-constitutional actions. Further, the degree
of interference and disruption occasioned by any suit is depen-
dent on a variety of factors, and no single characteristic can lo-
gically be looked to as a basis for winnowing out the cases in
which state standing should be granted.
Id. at 678 n.56.
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the states by the tenth amendment. The state in Mellon raised
such a claim as its first basis for standing.31 The Court dismissed
the contention, holding that the state had no standing to raise
nonjusticiable political questions concerning allocation of powers
between the state and federal governments. 32 A contrary ruling
would have opened the way for any state to challenge a
federal statute by alleging, as did Massachusetts, that the very
enactment of the law abridged powers reserved to the states.
Such a rule, which would obviate the necessity of showing con-
crete harm to person or property as a prerequisite to federal
jurisdiction, would result in advisory opinions about the legality
of statutes never tested in operation.38
The parens patriae count in Mellon was simply the tenth
amendment claim in another guise. Since it appeared that the
state was asserting no more than its citizens' purported interest
in not being governed by statutes that usurped the reserved
power of the states,34 no interest that could be defined as quasi-
sovereign was at stake.35 In South Carolina v. Katzenbach,3 6 a
31. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 480 (1923).
32. [TIhese matters . . . call for the judgment of the court
upon political questions .... For the rights for the protection
of which our authority is invoked, are the rights of sovereignty,
of political jurisdiction, of government, of corporate existence as
a State, with all its constitutional powers and privileges.
Id. at 483.
33. Bickel, supra note 19, at 88-90. Although the Court dismissed
the Mellon suit for lack of standing, it is evident from the discussion of
the "political question" that issues of justiciability were involved in the
decision. A disposition in which "the extent and kind of injury suffered
by the plaintiff is but one variable in a multivariable equation which
leads to a conclusion to render decision or not," has been described as
"decision standing." Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A Func-
tional Analysis, 86 HARv. L. Ruv. 645, 683-85 (1973). Where the Court
fails to sort out all the decision factors and expresses its holding only in
terms of standing, however, "a refusal to decide a particular case and
issue will be seen as denying the plaintiff any judicial remedy for quite
different legal issues which affect him in the same way." Id. at 687. This
seems to be a very apt description of the history of Mellon in the lower
federal courts, where a rule that states had no standing as parens patriae
to raise political questions was translated into an absolute bar to all
parens patriae suits, no matter what the issue presented by the case. See
note 22 supra and accompanying text.
34. See 262 U.S. at 485-86.
35. In the companion case, Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 486
(1923), the Court held that a Massachusetts taxpayer also lacked standing
to challenge the constitutionality of the statute because she had not suf-
fered any cognizable injury under the statute. The Court, although de-
scribing the decision as based on standing, alluded again to the political
question problem:
Looking through forms of words to the substance of [the
taxpayer's] complaint, it is merely that officials of the executive
department of the government are executing and will execute
1977]
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challenge to the constitutionality of the 1965 Voting Rights Act,
the claims were similar to those in Mellon. The state first claimed
standing on its own behalf, alleging as its injury a violation of
its rights under the due process and bill of attainder clauses. The
state's second alleged ground of standing was as parens patriae
representative of its citizens who were similarly injured by the
new law. Thus, it appears, as in Mellon, that the parens patriae
claim was simply another attempt by the state to secure a de-
cision on the political issue of infringement on state sovereignty.
The Court held that the state lacked standing in either capacity
to raise the constitutional challenge.37
Massachusetts v. Laird"8 presented the mix of standing and
political question issues in a slightly different context. There,
the Court, in a per curiam opinion, denied leave to file a
complaint in which the state, as parens patriae representative
of its male citizens subject to the military draft, sought to invoke
the Court's original jurisdiction in order to secure a ruling that
the conduct of the war in Vietnam without a congressional dec-
laration of war was unconstitutional. The suit raised a political
question incapable of judicial resolution; a decision on the merits
would have required the Court to adjudicate the division of
power between the legislative and executive branches of the
federal government.3 9 Moreover, because the suit was on behalf
an act of Congress asserted to be unconstitutional; and this we
are asked to prevent. To do so would be not to decide a ju-
dicial controversy but to assume a position of authority over the
governmental acts of another and co-equal department, an au-
thority which plainly we do not possess.
Id. at 488-89.
36. 383 U.S. 301 (1965).
37. Id. at 324. The Court appears nonetheless to have allowed the
state to sue as parens patriae to represent its citizens' interests under
the fifteenth amendment, for, without discussion of standing, it decided
the merits of that claim adversely to the state. Commentators have sug-
gested that the decision may indicate that Mellon has eroded over time.
See C. WrsGrr, FEDERAL COURTS 503 (1971); Bickel, supra note 19, at 88.
The majority in WUTC, 513 F.2d at 1152-53, and the dissenting judge
in Kleppe, 533 F.2d at 682, noted this suggestion as support for their
views. The political climate in which the South Carolina case was de-
cided, however, would appear to make it unlikely precedent for a more
ordinary case. See Bickel, supra note 19, at 80-84.
38. 400 U.S. 886 (1970). Justice Douglas, in his dissent from the
denial of leave to file the complaint, noted that the Solicitor General
had contended that Mellon barred the action. Id. at 887.
39. The policy against interfering with matters committed to the
other branches of the federal government is as old as Marbury v. Madi-
son, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), where the Court said:
The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of
individuals, not to enquire how the executive, or executive of-
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of a special segment of the state population rather than the
general public, it is unlikely that any valid quasi-sovereign in-
terest was at stake.40
Thus, the elements common to Mellon, South Carolina, and
Laird are: (1) an attempt to invoke the original jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court, (2) in order to raise essentially political
questions, (3) in a constitutional challenge without any foun-
dation in valid quasi-sovereign interests.
When the interests underlying Supreme Court denials of
parens patriae standing are thus identified, it is apparent that
those interests can be served without extending Mellon to pro-
hibit suits against federal agencies. 41  First, in a case such as
Kleppe or WUTC, the state does not seek to file a complaint
under the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. Because such
suits consume a disproportionate amount of time,42 the Court
ficers, perform duties in which they have a discretion. Ques-
tions in their nature political, or which are, by the constitution
and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in
this court.
Id. at 170. Similarly, in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), the Court
held that a challenge to the apportionment of the Tennessee state legis-
lature was not a nonjusticiable political question on the ground, inter
alia, that "[w] e have no question decided, or to be decided, by a political
branch of government coequal with this Court." Id. at 226.
40. It would seem that those men directly affected in Massa-
chusetts by this alleged wrong constitute neither a substantial
portion of the population nor a diverse sampling of the State.
Rather, they constitute a single group with one particular inter-
est, instead of the required large percentage and divergent in-
terest necessary for standing.
Comment, supra note 5, at 239-40.
41. The court in WUTC argued as well that suits against federal
agencies do not raise many of the difficulties found in ordinary parens
patriae cases.
[N]one of the considerations that have justified restrictions
upon the power of the state to represent the interest of its cit-
izenry parens patriae are present here. The original juris-
diction of the Supreme Court is not invoked, and the availability
of a remedy need not be restricted by the necessity of husband-
ing that court's limited resources. Since no state is sued, there
is no threat of circumvention of the Eleventh Amendment....
Since no damages are sought, there is no risk of duplicating re-
coveries .... Since no absent persons will be barred from a re-
medy otherwise available if this petition is entertained, the pro-
ceeding is not subject to criticism as a substitute for a class
action without its safeguards.
513 F.2d at 1152-53 (citations omitted).
42. See Note, The Original Jurisdiction of the United States Su-
preme Court, 11 STrA. L. Rzv. 665, 695 (1959). The commentator sug-
gests that other reasons favoring a restricted access to original jurisdic-
tion are the high costs to parties and the danger that such suits may be
inspired more by the political ambitions of state officials than by issues
suitable for original consideration by the Court.
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traditionally is chary of its original jurisdiction, preferring
to fulfill its primary role as a court of last appeal.43  Second,
because the suit attempts not to "redefine the relations of the
Federal Government to its citizenry," but simply "to protect its
citizens from discriminatory or unfair treatment, '44 it does not
require a federal court to adjudicate a political question for
which there are no judicially manageable standards.45  Rather,
a state parens patriae suit raises the same issue that a suit
by a private person, corporation, or interest group would raise:
whether the agency acted in conformity with its statutory au-
thority. Third, under the definition of quasi-sovereign interests
developed in cases involving parens patriae suits against other
states or private entities, problems of lack of concreteness or the
possibility of advisory opinions would be obviated. Valid parens
patriae standing would require the state to show that the dis-
puted agency action caused identifiable collective harm to state
citizens that was in turn translated into an additional, independ-
ent injury to the state environment or economy.4 6
In relying on Mellon to deny standing to the state of Pennsyl-
vania, the Kleppe court did not attempt to analyze these funda-
mental questions. Instead, it asserted that the disruption result-
ing from a state suit based on either statutory or constitutional
grounds,47 undermined the federalism principle of separate state
and federal parens patriae powers.48
43. Even where jurisdiction is otherwise proper, the Court may de-
cline to exercise it where the fact-finding problems in the case are be-
yond the Court's expertise. See, e.g., Ohio v. Wyandotte Chem. Corp.,
401 U.S. 493 (1971) (comulex scientific issues in interstate water pol-
lution case inappropriate for the Court to decide as an original matter).
44. Strausberg, supra note 4. at 19.
45. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
46. Logically, the same arguments should lead to the conclusion
that Mellon does not bar a proper parens patriae challenge to the consti-
tutionality of a federal statute. That is, if the general justiciability re-
quirements are satisfied by concrete allegations of valid quasi-sovereign
interests and the issues are ones the courts ordinarily decide, the
dangers that led to the rejection of parens patriae standing in Mellon
are not present. Whether, despite the logical appeal of this argument,
courts will be willing to take the final step in limiting Mellon to its facts
is questionable. The rule thus far has proven very durable and, in any
context, almost impervious to reasoned dissent. The Court's language,
see text accompanying note 18 supra, is certainly sweeping enough to
cover at least all constitutional suits by states and may very well lead
lower courts to conclude, with Professor Bickel, that with respect to the
constitutionality of federal laws, "the national government is fully in
privity with the people it governs, and needs, and should brook no
intermediaries." Bickel, supra note 19, at 89.
47. See note 30 supra.
48. 533 F.2d at 678.
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Under prevailing liberalized practice, however, any "person
aggrieved" by an agency action has standing under the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act 49 to seek judicial review. The plaintiffs
need only allege an injury in fact 50 that is arguably within the
zone of interests protected by the statute.51 Interest groups may
sue on behalf of their members if the members sufficiently allege
that they have been injured in fact by agency action.52 The
Kleppe court did not explain why the disruption of agency
processes caused by a parens patriae suit would be any more det-
rimental to the exercise of federal powers than a suit by a well-
financed public interest group or a giant corporation. Logically,
unless an agency action is unreviewable, there is no reason to
assume that one plaintiff's suit is quantitatively more disrup-
tive than another's. 53
Since quantitative disruption of operations provides no sup-
port for an outright ban on suits against federal agencies, the
court's argument depends on an assumption that the disruption
is qualitatively distinct; that is, any suit against an agency by a
state implicates questions of constitutional allocations of power.
As the dissenting judge in Kleppe points out,5 however, in a suit
challenging the manner in which a federal statute is adminis-
tered, the state seeks only to ensure that federal officials act
in accord with congressional intent. The state does not, as in
Mellon, dispute congressional authority to enact the statute or
contend that the state, not Congress, has power over the subject
of the law. Thus, an administrative challenge does not require
a federal court, in order to decide the merits, to resolve abstract
questions of sovereignty.
49. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
50. See Association of Data Processing Serv. Org. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150 (1970).
51. Id.
52. See United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
53. The only effect of a grant of standing, by itself, is that some
uncertainty may be engendered over the validity and continua-
tion of the government program by the mere fact of the liti-
gation; but the same uncertainty exists to some degree even if
the plaintiff in question is turned away, unless the government
action is held unreviewable so that no one will have standing.
Our conclusion, then, is that the disruptive effect of allowing the
suit on the government undertaking in question is not a factor
which should carry much weight in the standing determination
however pertinent it may be for other purposes.
Scott, supra note 33, at 678.
54. 533 F.2d at 682 (Lumbard, J., dissenting). The same distinction
was urged by the Ninth Circuit in WUTC, see text accompanying note
24 supra, and in Strausberg, supra note 4.
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Comparing the interests at stake in a suit such as Kleppe
with the constitutional policies that prompted the Mellon rule
reveals that the court of appeals was shadowboxing, attempting
to ward off dangers not presented by the case before it. Where
the state claim of standing passes muster under the established
quasi-sovereign interest standard and the case poses no challenge
to congressional policy-making authority, courts should grant
parens patriae standing and decline to perpetuate the practice
of uncritical reliance on an inapposite rule.
